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South Africa’s Youth and Political 
Participation, 1994-2014 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
South Africans hold – often simultaneously – contradictory beliefs about young 
people and politics.  On one hand, driven largely by a romanticized memory of 
Soweto and the street battles of the 1980s, many people see the youth as the 
primary catalyst of activism and political change.  On the other hand, driven by 
continuing media depictions of youth unemployment, township protests and the 
antics of the ANC Youth League, a wide range of commentators routinely 
experience “moral panics” about the apparent “crisis” of the youth and their 
corrosive effect on the country’s political culture.  In this report, we review a 
wide range of longitudinal survey data spanning the first two decades of 
democracy and find that there are indeed a series of real problems with South 
Africa’s political culture, particularly in the area of citizenship.  At the same 
time, these data clearly show that these problems are largely not peculiar to 
young people.  Across a range of different indicators, we find consistently that 
there are no, or relatively minor, age profiles to most dimensions of South 
African political culture.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has now been almost forty years since the Soweto uprisings.  Ever since that 
watershed moment, sparked and driven by rebellion amongst black high school 
students, South Africans have held – often simultaneously – contradictory 
beliefs about young people and politics.  On one hand, driven largely by a 
romanticized memory of Soweto and the street battles of the 1980s, many people 
see the youth as the primary catalyst of activism and political change.  In this 
vein, most of the country’s political parties still maintain youth organisations, 
some of which are given news media coverage far out of proportion to their 
actual influence on electoral politics or public policy (Bauer, 2011). On the other 
hand, driven by continuing media depictions of youth unemployment, township 
protests and the antics of the ANC Youth League (often with titles such as 
“Youth Unemployment: South Africa’s Ticking Bomb” (Bauer, 2011)), or “Our 
Youth Must Stop Protesting and Start Studying” (Hweshe, 2012), often 
accompanied by visual images of burning tires, scattered garbage, blockaded 
roads, stone throwing, and destroyed private and public property, a wide range 
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of commentators routinely experience “moral panics” about the apparent “crisis” 
of the youth and their corrosive effect on the country’s political culture (for a 
review of the same phenomenon during the 1990s, see Seekings, 1996).   
 
Yet these images often endure in the face of contrary, systematic evidence.  
While public opinion surveys are regularly conducted in South Africa by 
government, civil society, news media and universities, it is surprising how 
rarely important empirical findings and trends on political issues inform political 
discourse.  This is certainly true of youth and political participation.  Indeed, 
many South African researchers still resist modern methods of evidence 
collection to measure political participation.  The Centre for Public Participation, 
for example, between 2005 and 2008 published an annual journal on public 
participation called Critical Dialogue: Public Participation in Review, based 
almost entirely on various forms of qualitative research with small, 
unrepresentative samples of individuals in the Durban and broader KwaZulu 
Natal areas.  In a somewhat similar fashion, the African Centre for Citizenship 
and Democracy based at the University of the Western Cape’s School of 
Governance has produced a variety of research in the areas of citizenship, 
participation, development and democracy, most if not all of it based on various 
forms of qualitative methodologies with small, unrepresentative samples of 
individuals in the Cape Town and broader Western Cape.  
 
In this report, however, we review a wide range of longitudinal survey data 
spanning the first two decades of democracy and find that there are indeed a 
series of real problems with South Africa’s political culture, particularly in the 
area of citizenship.  At the same time, these data clearly show that these 
problems are largely not peculiar to young people.  Across a range of different 
indicators, we find consistently that there are no, or relatively minor, age profiles 
to most dimensions of South African political culture.  As a recent analysis of 
the “Born Free” generation (defined here as people who had come of age 
politically since the passage of the 1996 Constitution), concluded, “Rather than 
re-drawing the country’s main cleavages along lines of age and generation (as in 
post-war Germany), many of the key fault lines of apartheid (such as race, 
urban-rural residence, class and poverty) have been replicated within the new 
generation” (Mattes, 2012).    
 
 
The Concept of Political Culture 
 
Questions about youth and citizenship in democratic South Africa are essentially 
questions about what political scientists call political culture.  Besides the issues 
of how to measure and classify a given country’s political culture, political 
scientists’ prime concern is whether a given country’s political culture is 
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congruent with the demands or limitations placed on citizens by the existing 
political system (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966; 1969).  In other 
words, are South Africans, especially young South Africans, willing and able to 
play the roles required of them by the new democratic political system? 
 
A country’s political culture is normally defined as a set of norms or beliefs 
about four distinct political referents (for variations on this classificatory 
scheme, see Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965; Norris, 1998).  First of all, 
do people accept the officially defined national political community?  In our 
case, do people identify themselves as South Africans; take pride in that identity; 
and want to pass that identity onto their children?  Second, what do people 
believe about the existing political regime?  Do, in other words, South Africans 
believe that democracy is the most appropriate form of government?  Or would 
they prefer the country to be governed in non-democratic ways?  Third, how do 
people view the country’s political institutions and the incumbents who fill 
them?  Do South Africans feel that the laws made by Parliament, and the 
decisions of the courts and other law enforcement and regulatory agencies are 
legitimate, and thus binding upon them?  Fourth, and finally, the study of 
political culture focuses on citizenship.  How do South Africans understand their 
role as citizens, both in relation to the state as well as toward other people?  Do 
South Africans see themselves as efficacious, and are they engaged with the 
political process?  And are they willing to extend relevant rights to those who 
are different to them in terms of political persuasion, race, ethnicity, or national 
citizenship.  It is this last dimension of political culture to which we turn our 
primary attention in this report, though we will also consult evidence about the 
first three dimensions in order to contextualize and understand any differences in 
how young people view themselves as political actors. 
 
 
South Africa’s Political Culture 
 
What do we know about South Africa’s political culture in the post-apartheid 
era?  In terms of political community, South Africans exhibit an almost 
consensual national identity of which they are proud and that they wish to pass 
onto their children (Mattes, 2002; Bratton et al. 2005).  When it comes to the 
political regime, however, South Africans pay minimal lip service to the idea of 
democracy (at least when compared to citizens of other sub-Saharan countries).  
Significant minorities are willing to countenance one party rule or strong man 
dictatorship, especially if these regimes could promise economic development.  
And, because they tend to equate democracy with equalizing economic 
outcomes, they may simply believe, erringly, that those regimes are consistent 
with democracy (Mattes and Thiel, 1998; Mattes, 2001; Bratton and Mattes, 
2001; Bratton et al. 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007).  At the same time, South 
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Africans display relatively high levels of acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
country’s political institutions, especially the law and law enforcement 
institutions.   
 
Finally, and most importantly, there are major deficiencies at the level of 
citizenship.  While majorities of South Africans are interested in politics and 
speak about it with friends and colleagues, they exhibit particularly low levels of 
political efficacy and actual engagement with the political system.  Voter turnout 
decreased by thirty percentage points between the 1994 and 2005 elections, 
recovering only slightly in 2009.  The same patterns are evident with regard to 
levels of interest and participation in election campaigns (Mattes, 2011a; Glenn 
and Mattes, 2012; Schreiner and Mattes, 2012).  And between elections, public 
contact with members of parliament is rare, though interaction with local 
councillors increased substantially after the installation of single member wards 
in 2000.  In contrast to citizens in other sub-Saharan multi-party systems, South 
Africans do not see it as their job to hold elected legislators or councillors 
accountable for their performance between elections, preferring to leave it to the 
political party or the President.  Yet while South Africans exhibit some of the 
lowest levels of conventional political participation in Africa, they also display 
some of the highest levels of political protest (Mattes, 2008; Glenn and Mattes, 
2012).  And while South Africans personally identify with the new South Africa, 
they are not necessarily willing to accept others as part of that community, with 
the same rights and freedoms.  South Africans display high levels of intolerance 
of political difference (Gibson and Gouws, 2003). And they also exhibit the 
highest levels of xenophobia measured anywhere in the world (Mattes et al., 
2000; for a recent and comprehensive review of this evidence, see Mattes, 
2011b). 
 
Given this brief overview, the question that now confronts us is whether these 
numerous cultural maladies are present across generations, or reside 
disproportionately amongst the youngest, most recent entrants into the body 
politic?  As noted above, the common wisdom would lean decidedly in the latter 
direction. South Africa’s youth are generally seen as disengaged from 
conventional forms of political participation such as voting or contacting elected 
officials, yet also seen to be disproportionately more likely to engage in protest 
and political violence.  The usual reasons for this are assumed to be that young 
people are either apathetic, or alienated from the political process, or that they 
have internalized values that radically reject the new, democratic South Africa.  
  
The evidentiary bases for our analysis will consist of a longitudinal series of 
surveys of the country’s political culture carried out initially by the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) (1994 to 1998) and subsequently by 
Afrobarometer (2000 to 2012).  Each survey consisted of personal interviews 
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with random, stratified, nationally representative area probability samples.  In 
each case, interviews were conducted face-to-face, in the language of the 
respondents’ choice.  Sample sizes were generally 2,400, which would provide 
national results with a confidence interval of +/- 2 percentage points, with larger 
margins around sub-national estimates, such as for differing age cohorts.  In 
order to compare South Africa’s youth with older cohorts, we disaggregate the 
results into four age groups.  Using the standard international definition, “youth” 
are defined as those aged 18-25 (see for example www.social.un.org).  What we 
term “younger adults”’ fall into the 26-45 age range, “middle aged adult” 
respondents are 46-65, and “senior citizens” are 66 and older.   
 
 
South Africa’s Youth as Citizens 
 
To examine the degree to which young South Africans see themselves as 
citizens and engage in the political process, we first explore how people 
understand their role as citizens, and the extent to which this varies by age.  
Second, we assess South Africans’ levels of what political scientists call 
“cognitive engagement,” that is, the extent to which they are actively interested 
in and discuss politics with family and friends.  Third, we examine indicators of 
“cognitive sophistication,” or the degree of information and awareness they 
possess that would enable them to engage with the political process as critical 
citizens.   
 
Following these key preliminary indicators of citizenship, we turn to actual 
levels of political engagement.  Political scientists have found that political 
participation consists of discrete dimensions which are not necessarily 
cumulative.  That is, people who participate in what might appear to be the most 
demanding forms of participation, such as contacting and persuading elected 
officials, are not necessarily more likely to take part in less demanding forms, 
such as voting. Rather, people tend to specialize in different types, or 
dimensions of participation (Dalton, 2013).  First of all, some people tend to 
focus on “conventional” forms of participation, specializing in for example, 
voting, campaigning; contacting elected representatives or government officials; 
or more “communal” forms of participation such as attending community 
meetings or joining together with others to solve local issues.  Others tend to 
focus on what Dalton calls “unconventional” dimensions, specializing in things 
like protest or even political violence. 
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Role as Citizen 
 
How do South Africans understand the role of a citizen, and does this vary by 
age?  In general, South Africans seem to understand that democratic citizenship 
entails popular control over government, and the necessity of criticism.  As of 
2012, six-in-ten South Africans (61 percent) chose the statement, “The 
government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should tell government 
what to do” (as opposed to the statement, “The government is like a parent. It 
should decide what is good for us”).  In a response to a question last asked in 
2008, six-in-ten (60 percent) also agree with the statement, “We should be more 
active in questioning the actions of our leader” (as opposed to, “We should show 
more respect for authority”).  However, South Africans are far less likely to see 
it as their responsibility to hold elected officials to account.  Just one in five 
people answer “the voters,” when asked: “Who should be responsible for 
making sure that, once elected” local councillors (21 percent) or members of 
parliament (15 percent) “do their jobs.”  Most assign this task to “the party” or 
“the President.”   
 
However, we see virtually no age related differences in the responses to these 
three questions.  There was absolutely no difference in the belief that people are 
the bosses of government (Figure 1), and virtually no difference across the 
youngest three age cohorts, with a slightly higher response amongst senior 
citizens (66 percent) to the question about criticizing leaders (Figure 2).  Finally, 
there were no significant age differences in terms of people’s sense of who 
should hold local councillors to account (Figure 3).   
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Figure 1. Citizens Should Control Government 
 
Note: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 2. 
Statement 1: The government is like a parent. It should decide which is good for us. 
Statement 2: The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should tell 
government what to do. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Citizens Should Question Leaders 
 
Note: Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this country. 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 2. 
Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders. 
Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority. 
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Figure 3. Responsibility for Holding Local Councillors Accountable (% 
Voters) 
 
Note: Who should be responsible for: Making sure that, once elected, local government 
councilors do their jobs? 
 
 
Cognitive Engagement 
 
To what extent are South Africans and young people in particular, mentally 
engaged with the political process?  We address this by examining two elements 
of what political scientists call “cognitive engagement,” that is, the degree to 
which they are interested in politics and discuss it with family and friends?  As 
of the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, close to six-in-ten (56 percent) of all adult 
South Africans said they were “somewhat” or “very interested in public affairs” 
and seven-in-ten (71 percent) talk about “political matters” with friends or 
family “occasionally” or “frequently.”   
 
Yet, again, there are only small difference across the age groups within each 
survey year, and no consistent differences amongst the cohorts across time.  
While “youth” tend be less interested (56 percent) than “middle aged adults” (61 
percent) or “senior citizens” (63 percent) as of 2012, they are not statistically 
different from “younger adults” (54 percent).  Indeed, between 1997 and 2006, 
the youth often displayed the highest levels of interest of all age groups.  In fact, 
with the exception of the very first (1994) and most recent (2012) surveys, it is 
senior citizens who have consistently shown the least interest in politics, not the 
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youth (see Figure 4).  The same general trends characterize political discussion.  
As of the 2012 survey, there was at most a five percentage point difference 
between the youngest and oldest age cohorts, and it is senior citizens who from 
1997 to 2006 were consistently least likely to talk about politics (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4. Political Interest (% Somewhat or Very Interested)  
 
Note: How interested would you say you are in public affairs? 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Political Discussion (% Occasionally or Frequently) 
 
Note: “When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss 
political matters ____?”   
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Cognitive Sophistication 
 
To what extent do South Africans keep informed about politics and government?  
As of 2012, 51 percent said they read newspapers at least a few days a week.  
Along with senior citizens (38 percent), the youth (41 percent) are less likely to 
read newspapers on a frequent basis than younger (47 percent) or middle aged 
adults (52 percent).  Yet these differences are not consistent across time: from 
2002 and 2006, the youth were actually likely to read newspapers frequently 
(Figure 6).  At the same time, the youth exhibit very low levels of what political 
scientists call “political competence”: just 18 percent of youth disagree with the 
statement, “Politics and government seem so complicated that you can’t really 
understand what’s going on.”  But this was virtually the same result as yielded 
by all other age cohorts, a result that has remained stable since 1997 (Figure 7).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Newspaper Readership (% Every Day or Few Times A Week) 
 
Note: How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers? 
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Figure 7. Politics and Government Affairs Understandable 
 
Note: “Sometimes politics and government seem so  complicated that a person like me cannot 
really understand what is going on.” (% Agree or Strongly Agree) 
 
In the 2006 survey, Afrobarometer investigated the level of South Africans’ 
political knowledge across a wide range of dimensions. The results 
demonstrated that political awareness was highest with regard to whether or not 
the government had policies about the provision of free health care (85 percent) 
and education (77 percent), was moderately high with regard to a series of 
political facts such as the identity of the largest party in Parliament (85 percent), 
the number of terms the President can serve (48 percent) and the role of the 
Constitutional Court (36 percent), and varied widely with regard to the identity 
of incumbent leaders such as the Deputy President (60 percent), their local 
councillor (18 percent) and their designated Member of Parliament (1 percent).  
But, to return to the same refrain, there is no clear pattern whereby political 
awareness systematically increases (or decreases) with age. Across, these 
indicators, young adults (26-45) tend to have the highest levels of information, 
and senior citizens (66 and above) the least, but the differences are rarely 
substantively important (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Political Knowledge: Incumbents, Facts and Policies (2006) 
 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2006. 
 
Thus, a clear and consistent picture has emerged. The surprising finding, in light 
of the common wisdom, is that across a range of indicators of how citizens think 
about their role and capacity as citizens, there is virtually no “age profile” to 
democratic citizenship in South Africa. Thus far, across several different 
indicators of democratic citizenship, the youth look almost identical to their 
older counterparts.   
 
 
Voting and Campaigning 
 
We find more meaningful age effects, however, when it comes to actual 
participation.  First of all, we examine participation in elections and election 
campaigns.  A broad indicator of people’s engagement with partisan politics, 
and a strong predictor of their levels of electoral participation, is what political 
scientists call “partisan identification”: that is, whether or not they “feel close” 
to any political party.  Tracked since 1994, the youth are generally least likely to 
identify with a party (at least since 2000) (Figure 9).  The differences, however, 
have generally been relatively small, though they increased in 2012 to 12 
percentage points (with senior citizens most likely to identify with any party). 
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Figure 9. Partisan Identification 
 
Note: Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
 
To examine other indicators of electoral participation, we turn to questions from 
a series of post-election surveys known as the South African National Election 
Study, conducted by Idasa in 1994 and 1999 and by the University of Cape 
Town in 2004 and 2009.  The results demonstrate that the youth are less likely, 
and have become increasingly less likely to turn out and vote on election day 
than other South Africans (Figure 10).  At the same time, it is important to note 
that this is a common finding around the world (Norris, 2002), and seems more a 
function of the factors associated with the aging process than anything specific 
to South Africa.  Yet while younger voters were less likely to go to the polls in 
2009, they were most likely to follow the 2009 election campaign (as well as in 
1999) (Figure 11) and also most likely to have talked to friends or family about 
the election (Figure 12).  
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Figure 10. Voted in Recent Election 
 
Note: With regard to the most recent national election in [2009], which statement is true for 
you?  (% Voted) 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Followed Campaign (% Closely / Very Closely) 
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Figure 12. Discussed Campaign with Family (% Often or Sometimes) 
 
Moreover, there are no age related profiles for a range of other types of 
campaign participation, such as the proportion of people who say they were 
contacted by a political party during the campaign (Figure 13), attended an 
election rally (Figure 14), or worked for a party or a candidate during the 
campaign (Figure 15).   
 
 
 
Figure 13. Contacted by Party during Campaign 
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Figure 14. Attended Election Rally 
 
Note: Thinking about the last national election in ____, did you attend a campaign meeting or 
rally? 
 
 
Figure 15. Worked for Party or Candidate 
 
Note: Thinking about the last national election in  _____, did you work for a candidate or 
party? 
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Contacting and Communing  
 
Age related differences in political engagement become more visible when we 
examine indicators of participation in conventional forms of non-electoral 
activity.  Compared to older South Africans, the youth are indeed significantly 
less likely to get involved in community politics or contact elected officials.  As 
of 2012, 55 percent of all South Africans said they had attended a community 
meeting in the previous year, but the youth (49 per cent) were 14 percentage 
points less likely to participate than younger adults (63 percent) (Figure 16).  
And while 42 percent told Afrobarometer interviewers they had joined with 
others to raise an issue in their community, the youth (36 percent) were 10 
percentage points less likely to do so than young adults (46 percent) (Figure 17).  
While 27 percent had contacted a local councillor in the previous year (Figure 
18), older adults (31 percent) were almost twice as likely to do this as youth (16 
percent).  Moreover, the gap between the youth and other cohorts widened 
significantly since 2004.  The same general pattern is evident in a set of 
questions asked in 2012 specifically about local government (Figure 19).  The 
youth are slightly less likely to have observed a problem with their local 
government, and significantly less likely to discuss the problem with other 
community members, or get together with other people to address that problem.  
However, the differences are relatively small or non-existent in terms of whether 
or not they discussed the problem with community leaders, or complained to 
government officials or took their complaint to the news media. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Attended Community Meetings 
 
Note: Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year: Attended a community meeting? 
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Figure 17. Joined With Others to Raise Issue 
 
Note: Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year: Got together with others to raise an issue?  
 
 
 
Figure 18. Contacted Local Councillor 
 
Note: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about 
some important problem or to give them your views: A local government councilor? 
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Figure 19. Contact with Local Government (2012) 
 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2012. 
 
 
Unconventional Participation: Protest and Political 
Violence 
 
Thus, the youngest South African citizens, aged 18-25 are less likely to take part 
in conventional forms of politics such as voting, contacting, and communing 
(but not campaigning).  We now turn to examine indictors of unconventional 
forms of participation, particularly protest and the use of violence.  
Afrobarometer surveys tracked relatively high rates of self-reported participation 
in protest (“attending a demonstration or protest march”) between 2000 and 
2006, but reflect a downward trend thereafter.  Yet, in contrast to the typical 
media depiction of township protests, protest potential amongst the youth has 
been relatively high, but not any higher than young adults (those aged 26-45) 
(Figure 20).  And as of 2012, 4 percent of respondents told interviewers that they 
had “used force or violence for a political cause” at least once in the preceding 
year, down slightly from 2008. Again, however, there are no significant 
differences between the rate at which youth resort to violence and that of other 
citizens (though senior citizens are consistently less likely to do so) (Figure 21).  
Moreover, the great majority of South Africans agree that “the use of violence is 
never justified in South African politics today,” with youth respondents most 
20 
 
likely to agree (70 percent) (Figure 22).  And in responses to a new set of 
questions asked in 2012, youth respondents are no less likely to view non-
payment of services as “wrong and punishable” (though they are less likely to 
see tax avoidance as categorically wrong) (Figure 23). 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Attended Protest or Demonstration 
 
Note: Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year: Attended a demonstration or protest march? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Used Force or Violence for Political Cause 
 
Note: Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year: Used force or violence for a political cause? 
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Figure 22. Violence Never Justified 
 
Note: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 2. 
Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in South African politics today. 
Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just 
cause. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Compliance Morality (2012) 
 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2012. 
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Others as Political Actors 
 
What do young South Africans think about other citizens and residents?  First, 
while just 17 percent agreed, in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, that “most 
people can be trusted” (a widely cited dimension of social capital: see Putnam, 
1993; Norris, 2002), the figure was slightly higher for youth respondents (19 
percent) (Not Shown).  Afrobarometer has not measured South Africans’ levels 
of (in)tolerance of other people. However, the preeminent study of South 
Africans’ willingness to extend political rights to their least liked political group 
found high levels of intolerance, but also found that age was not an important 
predictor (Gibson and Gouws, 2003). Given the country’s recent history, no 
analysis of the country’s political culture would be complete without addressing 
how South Africans relate to the many legal and illegal foreign residents in the 
country, especially since young people featured widely in media coverage of the 
wave of xenophobic violence that spread across South Africa’s townships in 
2007. Indeed, 29 percent of the youth favoured, at least as of 2008, a total 
prohibition on immigration into the country, and 25 percent supported total 
repatriation of all foreign residents.  These figures were both significantly higher 
than for older respondents.  However, once they are asked about possible anti-
foreigner behaviours, the approximately one-third who say they would be likely 
to join with others to prevent immigrants from moving into their neighbourhood 
(35 percent), operating a business in their area (36 percent), enrolling in local 
schools (35 percent), or becoming a co-worker (33 percent), is statistically 
indistinguishable from the responses of older cohorts.  Thus, consistent with 
Gibson and Gouws’ findings about South Africans’ tolerance of their fellow 
citizens, South Africans exhibit high levels of intolerance toward immigrants, 
but it is not possible to pin the problem on the youth. 
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Figure 24. Policy Preferences and Potential Intolerant Actions toward 
Foreigners 
 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2012. 
 
 
Contextualizing Youth Political Engagement 
 
In contrast to the common wisdom, South Africa’s youth are no different from 
their older fellow citizens in a wide range of attitudes about citizenship.  They 
have the same conception of the role of the citizen.  They have slightly lower 
levels of cognitive engagement and cognitive sophistication than some, but not 
all other age cohorts, and the differences are certainly not large.  And they are no 
more likely than other South Africans to hold negative views and intentions 
toward immigrants. 
 
There are larger differences, however, in terms of some, but not all indicators of 
physical engagement in the political process. The youth are far less likely to vote 
in national elections, though they are not less likely to get involved in other 
campaign activities, such as attending rallies or working for political parties, and 
they are most likely to follow election campaigns.  Between elections, however, 
the youth are significantly less likely to join together with people to address 
issues and solve problems, contact elected leaders, and become involved in 
community affairs and local government.  But they are not any more likely to 
participate in protest action, or resort to political violence.   
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Why are younger people less likely to become physically involved in 
conventional forms of democratic politics?  The popular wisdom might suggest 
that they harbour systematically different values toward the new South Africa 
and its democratic system: that they are more apathetic and more alienated, and 
that they possess lower levels of national identity, are less committed to the 
democratic process, and are less likely to see state enforcement institutions as 
legitimate, than older generations.  
 
 
Apathy and Alienation 
 
We have already seen that the youth are no more apathetic, with equal levels of 
political interest and political discussion, as other age cohorts.  Are they more 
alienated?  The longest repeated item on the Afrobarometer that taps into the 
concept of alienation is a series of questions that ask people how frequently they 
believe elected leaders listen to them.  Whether we ask about Members of 
Parliament, (Figure 25) or Local Councillors (Figure 26), we see very sharp 
increases in alienation over the past 15 years, but we also see that youth 
respondents are usually least likely to feel that elected leaders ignore their views. 
 
 
  
Figure 25. Alienation: Members of Parliament Don’t Listen to People like 
Me 
 
Note: MPs Listen To People (Never / Only Sometimes) 
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Figure 26. Alienation: Local Councillors Don’t Listen to People Like Me 
 
Note: MPs Listen To People (Never / Only Sometimes) 
 
 
Political Community 
 
Does the root of low levels of youth participation lie in their rejection of the new 
South Africa?  We find just the opposite: young South Africans, like those of 
other age groups, exhibit very high levels of national identity.  They are proud of 
being South African (see Figure 27).  They also believe that a South African 
identity is an important part of how they see themselves, and they want to pass 
that identity on to their children (Not Shown). 
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Figure 27. Pride in SA National Identity 
 
Note: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: It makes you 
proud to be called a South African. 
 
 
Democratic Regime 
 
Youth respondents are, in fact, less likely than others to believe that “democracy 
is always preferable” to an authoritarian government (by 4 percentage points) 
(Figure 28). They are also less likely to reject a regime where “Only one 
political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office” (Figure 29).  And 
they are also the least likely to be “unwilling” to “give up regular elections and 
live under” “a non-elected government or leader [that] could impose law and 
order, and deliver houses and jobs” (just 28 percent, 8 points lower than senior 
citizens) (Figure 30).  Yet while these differences are meaningful and should not 
be ignored, the far more important finding is the generally weak level of support 
for democracy across all age groups. 
 
27 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Support for Democracy 
 
Note: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? 
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Rejection of One-Party Rule 
 
Note: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold 
office? 
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Figure 30. Unwilling to Live Under ‘Dictatorship That Delivers’ 
 
Note: If a non-elected government or leader could impose law and order, and deliver houses 
and jobs: How willing or unwilling would you be to give up regular elections and live under 
such a government? 
 
 
State Legitimacy 
 
Finally, we turn to examine some indicators of the legitimacy of South Africa’s 
political institutions.  By legitimacy, we mean a sense of “moral ought-ness” 
(Eldridge, 1977): that is, the belief that the institutions, especially the 
enforcement institutions of state are appropriate, and that their decisions ought to 
be obeyed regardless of whether or not one agrees with those decisions (Easton, 
1965). Young South Africans are no less likely than other citizens to agree that, 
“The Courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide 
by” (Figure 31) or that “The police always have the right to make people obey 
the law” (Figure 32). 
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Figure 31. Courts Have To Make Binding Decisions by Age Cohort 
 
Note: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The 
courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Police Have Right to Make People Obey the Law 
 
Note: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The 
police always have the right to make people obey the law. 
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Youth and Drivers of Political Participation 
 
What are the drivers of political participation in South Africa, and are they the 
same amongst young people as older citizens?  In order to answer this question, 
we used the Afrobarometer South Africa 2008 data set and ran a series of 
statistical analyses called multiple regression which test the extent to which a 
number of individual level characteristics, values and attitudes actually predict, 
or explain whether a person actually participated in various activities, as well as 
how often they participated.  Using the same set of predictor variables, we tested 
three separate models of communing (which is an average index of the frequency 
with which people attend local meetings and join with others to address 
community issues), contacting (which is an average index of the frequency with 
which people contact members of parliament, government officials, and local 
councillors), and protesting (which is an average index of the frequency with 
which people attend protest demonstrations and took part in political violence). 
  
As predictor variables, we use many of the very factors that we have reviewed in 
this paper, but also add other important issues which can be grouped into three 
larger conceptual categories. First, we examined a number of demographic 
issues such as age (18-25 years old), race (black), gender (male), place of 
residence (urban), employment, lived poverty (the frequency with which people 
go without basic necessities), partisanship (ANC), and whether or not they are 
member of a community group.  Second, we tested the effect of various aspects 
of cognitive sophistication including formal education, news media use, 
cognitive engagement (an average index of political interest and political 
discussion), and internal efficacy (an index of whether or not they feel able to 
get together with others to make members of parliament and local councillors 
listen to them).  Third, we tested a series of values relevant to the new South 
Africa such as national identity, demand for democracy, state legitimacy, and 
whether they feel citizens should hold leaders accountable, whether they think 
citizens should be critical, and whether citizens should tell their leaders what to 
do.  And finally, beyond these “main effects,” we also wanted to know whether 
there were any “interaction effects.”  That is, do any of these factors have 
different effects amongst the youth? Thus, for example, while we might we 
might uncover effects of being young, and of being poor, we also would want to 
know whether the effect of being poor differs amongst young people, compared 
to older people.   
  
The results, as displayed in the first column of Table 1, indicate that these 
predictors, when combined, provide a solid explanation of “communing” 
(Adjusted R
2 
= .185).  Across all respondents, the strongest driver of community 
participation is membership in a community group (Beta, the standardized 
regression coefficient, =0.285), followed by youth (B=0.237), cognitive 
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engagement (0.167), race (being black) (B=0.144) and demand for democracy 
(0.094).  Thus, while we previously saw that youth had lower rates of attendance 
at community meetings, or joining in issue groups than other South Africans, 
once we “hold constant,” or take into account the simultaneous effect of other 
factors, being young is actually a strong positive predictor of community 
participation.  One reason is that, because they are less likely to be integrated 
into their communities, young people are less likely to belong to community 
organisations.  But another reason is the peculiar effect of two factors amongst 
the youth.  While cognitive engagement, in general, increases the likelihood of 
community participation, it reduces it amongst those aged 18 to 25.  And while 
national identity has no effect, in general, younger people with strong 
attachments to South Africa are less likely to participate.   
 
We are also able to construct a solid model of “Contacting” (Adjusted R2 = 
0.176) (the second column of Table 1).  The strongest predictor, again, is 
membership in a community group (B=0.270) followed by a sense of internal 
efficacy (B=0.145), being black (0.118), cognitive engagement (0.094) and 
newspaper readership (0.057).  In addition, there is one important interaction 
effect: while neither being young, nor demand for democracy has any general 
effect, young South Africans who are committed to democracy are significantly 
less likely to contact government officials or elected representatives.   
  
Finally, these variables provide a much less effective set of predictors of 
participation in violent protest, explaining just 6.2 percent of the variance.  
Again, the most important driver is membership in a community group 
(B=0.146) followed by cognitive engagement (0.092), being black (0.068) and 
male (.059).  Two values also play important roles.  Those people who demand 
democracy (-0.061) and those who see the country’s law enforcement 
institutions as legitimate (-0.052) are less likely to take part in violent protest.  
Finally, there are two important interaction effects of age.  While community 
group membership increases protest, in general, young people who belong to a 
group are more likely to take part in violent protest.  And while feelings of 
national identity have no general effect, young people with a strong sense of 
patriotism are less likely to protest. 
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Table 1. Predictors of Communing, Contacting and Protesting 
 
 Communing* Contacting Protesting 
Demographics    
Youth (Aged 18-25) 0.237*** -- -- 
Gender (Male) 0.065*** -- 0.059** 
Race (Black) 0.144*** 0.118*** 0.068*** 
Lived Poverty 0.083*** 0.050* -- 
Member of Community Group 0.285*** 0.270*** 0.146*** 
Cognitive Sophistication    
Newspaper Readership -- 0.057** -- 
Cognitive Engagement 0.167*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 
Internal Efficacy 0.057** 0.145*** -- 
Values    
National Identity -- -- NS 
Demand for Democracy 0.094*** -- -0.061** 
State Legitimacy -- -- -0.052* 
Voters Should Hold Leaders Accountable 0.057** 0.046* -- 
Interactions    
Youth * Member of Community Group  -- 0.064** 
Youth * Cognitive Engagement .-0.102**   
Youth * National Identity -0.188** -- -0.150* 
Youth * Demand for Democracy -- -0.138* -- 
    
Multiple r 0.434 0.423 0.257 
Adjusted R
2
 0.185 0.176 0.062 
 
*     Average construct of the frequency with which people attend community meetings and 
       join with others to address community issues 
**   Average construct of the frequency with which people contact members of parliament,  
      government officials, local councillors   
*** Average construct of the frequency with which people attend demonstrations and take 
       part in political violence 
 
Note: Cells display standardized (Beta) regression coefficients 
Source: 2008 Afrobarometer South Africa Survey. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This very brief review of indicators of key dimensions of South Africa’s 
political culture indicates that there are a series of real problems with citizenship 
in the country.  At the same time, it clearly shows that these problems are not 
peculiar to young people. Across a range of different indicators, we have 
witnessed consistently that there is no, or a relatively minor, age profile to South 
African political culture. As a recent analysis of the “Born Free” generation 
(defined as all people who had come of age politically since the passage of the 
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1996 Constitution), concludes, “Rather than re-drawing the country’s main 
cleavages along lines of age and generation (as in post-war Germany), many of 
the key fault lines of apartheid (such as race, urban-rural residence, class and 
poverty) have been replicated within the new generation” (Mattes, forthcoming: 
21).    
 
On one hand, the fact that the youth are not “worse” than their elders may 
reassure those who are concerned about the state of the youth.  On the other 
hand, this same finding should be cause for concern given that the youth have 
reached political maturity in a free and democratic political system, and that they 
have been educated by a new school curriculum that claimed to have democratic 
citizenship as one of its key ‘outcomes.’  
 
But the reality of post-apartheid South Africa is that while a new generation has 
come of age with freedoms and liberties of which their parents could have only 
dreamt, all South Africans now confront a “thin” form of democracy in which, 
with the exception of local ward councillors, no putatively elected representative 
at the provincial or national level are actually elected to office by the voters, but 
are rather selected by party officials.  By producing disincentives for elected 
officials to learn too much about the needs and policy preferences of the voters, 
lest those opinions lead them into conflict with their party leaders, it also teaches 
citizens that active engagement with elected officials is not a rational use of 
scarce time or resources.   
 
And while South Africa experienced substantial growth over the last decade, 
increasing the wealth of one-fifth of all black South Africans and moving one-
in-ten into the middle class, enduring unemployment and poverty have meant 
that the children of the bottom two-fifths of South African households now grow 
up under worse material conditions than their parents (Leibbrandt et al., 2006; 
Leibbrandt and Levinsohn, 2011).    
 
And while there has been a drive toward universal education, with a new school 
curriculum designed to produce more engaged citizens, the intended value 
outcomes were so implicit in the new curriculum that poorly trained teachers in 
increasingly dysfunctional schools have struggled to produce any substantially 
changes in the belief systems of their matriculants.  
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